Darwin and Tinbergen represent two enduring contrasts in comparative cognitive psychology: in the types of behaviors studied and the kinds of explanations sought. Darwin encouraged the search for human-like behaviors in animals as evidence for evolutionary continuity of mental processes. Tinbergen encouraged the careful causal analysis of animal behaviors as such and eschewed interpretations in terms of anthropomorphic processes. The Darwinian program has reemerged in contemporary research on comparative cognition. Its development and relationship to other areas of behavioral biology are traced. In using behavior as a window onto the animal mind, it is important to remember the lessons of Tinbergen and like-minded behaviorists in psychology. Several of the challenges that arise in attempting to show that other species share complex cognitive processes with humans are discussed in the light of the contrast represented by Darwin and Tinbergen, as are examples of how these approaches are being productively integrated.
Introduction
Darwin and Tinbergen in the title of this chapter represent two enduring contrasts in comparative cognitive psychology: in the types of behaviors studied and the kinds of explanations sought. Th is chapter begins with some historical background, from the line of research that began with Darwin to a sketch of how several subfi elds in the biology of mind and behavior are converging in the contemporary comparative study of cognition. Th is convergence is a source of much that is exciting and new, but it can also be a source of misunderstanding and controversy. Some of the challenges that result have their roots in the contrasting approaches identifi ed in the title, as discussed in the second half of the chapter.
Darwin is in the title because, in Th e Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex (Darwin, 1871) , he set an agenda for studying animal minds that to a remarkable degree is still being played out. By focusing on human-like behaviors in other species, it encouraged explanations that were often dangerously anthropomorphic in interpreting human-like behaviors as produced by human-like thought without properly considering alternatives. Tinbergen represents the big chunk of the twentieth century in which the prevailing approach in both biology and psychology was a reaction to anthropomorphism in its devotion to careful causal analyses of animal behavior as such, much of it not terribly humanlike but nonetheless important in the lives of the creatures concerned-homing in wasps or courtship in gulls and sticklebacks. Recently there has been a big swing back toward the Darwinian program of looking for human-like cognitive abilities 2 darwin, tinbergen, and the evolution of comparative cognition in other species-tool use, planning (chapters 12 and 13 of this volume), social deception, and so on. Th is approach is fraught with old intractable problems. Some of them arise because, in the excitement of using behavior as a window onto the mind, it's easy to forget the lessons of Tinbergen and Skinner about the importance of present cues and past history in controlling it.
Th e contrast represented here by Darwin and Tinbergen is sometimes referred to as that between anthropocentric and ecological approaches (Kamil & Mauldin, 1988; Shettleworth, 1993) , that is, the study of animal behaviors in relation to human behavior vs. the study of behavior in its ecological and evolutionary context. Of course, as a keen naturalist, Darwin recorded many observations of behavior that are simply fascinating in their own right, as in his experiments on the sensory abilities of earthworms (Darwin, 1881) . Nevertheless, as discussed more in a moment, his role in the history of comparative cognition was to focus it on human-like accomplishments of other animals. Tinbergen and other ethologists, in contrast, were primarily concerned with how animals do what they do in nature. Indeed, one of the ways in which early ethologists defi ned their fi eld as the biological study of behavior, distinct from animal psychology, was by its focus on natural behaviors of diverse species-insects, birds, and fi sh as much as mammals (Burkhardt, 2005) . In addition, Tinbergen (1963) famously identifi ed four kinds of questions that can be asked about any behavior: its proximal cause, as in the cues that elicit it; its developmental history; its current function, as in its contribution to survival and reproduction; and its evolution. Th e distinctions between these questions need to be kept clearly in mind so that, for example, understanding the function of a behavior is not mistaken for understanding its proximal cause, but Tinbergen emphasized that a complete understanding of any behavior includes answers to all of them. Moreover, the answer to one may illuminate answers to the others (Sherry, 2005) .
Much of the richness and excitement that characterizes the study of animal or comparative cognition in the early twentieth century has come from the participation of people who bring knowledge of diff erent species and study them from diff erent perspectives, but the contrasts symbolized by Darwin and Tinbergen endure. Th ey are expressed, not only in the pervasive tension between anthropocentric vs. ecological or psychological vs. biological approaches to choice of species and problems, but in a perhaps more basic tension between anthropomorphic vs.
"killjoy" behaviorist, or "higher vs. lower" explanations for behavior. Th is tension was already well developed when people began studying animal cognitive processes in the late nineteenth century, as discussed in the next section.
Th e Evolution of Comparative Cognition Darwin and the Anthropocentric Approach
In On the Origin of Species, Darwin (1859) largely steered clear of the touchy topic of human evolution. However, 12 years later, in Th e Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex, (Darwin, 1871) , man-or humanity-was in the forefront, and right up front he devoted two chapters to comparing human mental powers to those of other species. At the beginning of chapter 2 he writes…. "My object in this chapter is solely to shew that there is no fundamental diff erence between man and the higher mammals in their mental faculties" (Darwin 1871, p. 35) . Even though he acknowledges that "no classifi cation of the mental powers has been universally accepted" he does a great job of providing one. Th e topics in chapter 2 include "Certain instincts in common, emotions, curiosity, imitation, attention, memory, imagination, reason, progressive improvement, tools, and weapons used by animals, language, self-consciousness, sense of beauty, belief in God, spiritual agencies, superstitions." In chapter 3 he goes on to "the moral sense and the qualities of social animals." Maybe minus the part on religion, this could be a tour of contemporary research.
Darwin concludes his review of the evidence as follows: "Th e diff erence in mind between man and the higher animals, great as it is, is certainly one of degree and not of kind." (Darwin, 1871, p. 105) . Proving this had to be central to Darwin's agenda because it seems to clinch the argument that humans are part of the same evolutionary tree as all the other animals. Th is is an anthropocentric agenda, but Darwin is often accused (e.g., by Bolhuis & Wynne, 2009 ) of being anthropomorphic as well, in the sense of interpreting animal behaviors as refl ecting thoughts similar to those a person would have when engaging in comparable behaviors. Because his goal was to prove the anthropomorphic case, this is not surprising, but often Darwin was admirably circumspect. For example, in a passage foreshadowing contemporary speculations that animals engage in mental time travel (chapters 12 and 13 of this volume) he writes, "But can we feel sure that an old dog with an excellent memory and some power of imagination, as shewn by his dreams, never refl ects on his past pleasures in the chase?" (p. 62, Darwin, 1871) .
He thus raises the possibility of what we would now call episodic memory without claiming we can feel sure from the dog's behavior that he is refl ecting on his past pleasures. Elsewhere, with regard to the possibility that animals have abstract concepts, he refers to "the impossibility of judging what passes through the mind of an animal" (Darwin, 1874, p. 83) .
Some of Darwin's most enthusiastic followers were not always so circumspect. Gathering anecdotes about clever animals seemed to be an important way to support Darwin, and some of their excesses of anthropomorphism had an important role in the early history of comparative psychology (Boakes, 1984) . Anecdotes about animals who could open gates and doors were prominent here, and they invited anthropomorphic explanations, as when Romanes (1892, p. 421) described how his coachman's cat came to open a door. "First the animal must have observed that the door is opened by the hand grasping the handle and moving the latch. Next she must reason, by 'the logic of feelings'-If a hand can do it, why not a paw?" Th e tendency to jump to conclusions about how a clever-looking behavior has developed in a single subject or what mechanisms underlie it without much evidence one way or another is still with us. For example, the now world-famous chimpanzee in a Swedish zoo who regularly piled up stones in the off hours and threw them at spectators when the zoo was open is said to plan (Osvath, 2009) . Planning suggests that gathering stones and piling them on the side of the enclosure nearest the spectators developed after the animal discovered the rewarding eff ect of throwing the stones. But the piles of stones and the way in which the chimpanzee replaced them when they had been removed were apparently not documented until after stone throwing became a problem for the zoo keepers. Th e possibility that the animal originally began collecting stones for some reason other than planning to throw them is now untestable, but it is dismissed nonetheless (see also Suddendorf & Corballis, 2010) .
Th e excesses of Darwin's supporters stimulated a killjoy backlash, with eff ects felt through most of the twentieth century. Th ese include Lloyd Morgan's canon (Morgan, 1894, p. 53) : "In no case may we interpret an action as the outcome of the exercise of a higher psychical faculty, if it can be interpreted as the outcome of the exercise of one which stands lower in the psychological scale." Th e problems with Morgan's canon include its assumption of a scala naturae of "psychical faculties," the implication that we can judge what is "higher" and "lower," and accepting the principle of parsimony in psychological processes (Mitchell, 2005; Sober, 2005) . One reasonable modern interpretation of the Canon derives from the widely accepted principle of cladistic parsimony (see Sober, 2005) : the fact that simple forms of memory and associative learning have been found in all species tested, including even simple invertebrates (Papini, 2008) justifi es claims that these processes evolved very early, perhaps refl ecting universal causal processes and/or properties of nervous systems, and, therefore, are present throughout the animal kingdom. Th us, no special evidence should be required to invoke them for explaining behavior of a previously unstudied species such as New Caledonian crows or bonobos.
However, one can just as reasonably use such phylogenetic reasoning to argue that species suffi ciently closely related to humans should share cognitive processes other than associative learning such as reasoning and imagination (Sober, 2005) . Evolutionary thinking also supports suggestions that even species distantly related to humans and apes but facing similar environmental demands may have convergently evolved similar cognitive mechanisms (Emery & Clayton, 2004) . Nevertheless, the default in contemporary research continues to be the killjoy assumption that, in the absence of good evidence to the contrary, behavior should be explained by associative learning plus species-typical behavioral predispositions (Wasserman & Zentall, 2006) . Given the ambiguities of even a modern interpretation of Morgan's canon, a better-justifi ed approach may be evidentialism: don't accept "lower" or "higher" explanations of behavior without good evidence (Fitzpatrick, 2008; Sober, 2005) . Accordingly, as discussed later in this chapter, one of the biggest challenges for contemporary research is formulating unambiguous tests for alternative explanations of behaviors suggestive of "higher" processes, such as mental time travel, metacognition, theory of mind, and physical understanding (Heyes, 2008) . E. L. Th orndike (1911 /1970 Galef, 1998 ) was a pioneer in testing alternatives to anthropomorphic explanations. His studies of how dogs and cats learned to escape from "puzzle boxes" were directly inspired by anecdotes like those purveyed by Romanes. His contribution was to do experiments and to show that performances like opening latches can be accounted for by simple trial and error learning, with no evidence for insight or imitation. Subsequently, with the notable exceptions of Kohler's (1925 Kohler's ( /1959 ) studies of apes and Tolman's (e.g., 1948) writings, the tendency to look for human-like thought and reasoning in animal problem solving went largely underground for most of the rest of the twentieth century. In the history of comparative psychology, the resulting emphasis on studying causes of behavior without speculating about internal mental processes is usually identifi ed with the growth of behaviorism (Boakes, 1984) , but it was just as characteristic of ethology. For example, at the very beginning of Th e Study of Instinct Tinbergen writes, "Because subjective phenomena cannot be observed objectively in animals, it is idle either to claim or to deny their existence. Moreover to ascribe a causal function to something that is not observable often leads to false conclusions." (Tinbergen, 1951, p. 4) .
Th e Development of Evolutionary Comparative Cognition
A few years after Tinbergen was writing, we began to hear about something called cognitive ethology from the distinguished biologist Donald Griffi n (1976; 1978) . "Th e basic goal of … cognitive ethology will be to learn as much as possible about the likelihood that nonhuman animals have mental experiences….." (Griffi n, 1978, p. 528) , in other words, to bring animal consciousness into ethology. Although Griffi n updated the information informing his position until almost the end of his life (Griffi n & Speck, 2004) , his emphasis on mentalistic interpretations of animal communication and other behaviors found many detractors (e.g., Yoerg & Kamil, 1991) . After a couple of lively debates in Th e Behavioral and Brain Sciences (Dennett, 1983; Griffi n, 1978) cognitive ethology as such was short lived (see Allen, 2004) , inspiring one published conference (Ristau, 1991a) and some new research on piping plovers (Ristau, 1991b) . Arguably, however, Griffi n's exhortations to animal behaviorists to throw off the shackles of behaviorism and consider the possibility of human-like thinking even in assassin bugs have stimulated much of the research discussed in this Handbook.
To some (Allen, 2004; Kamil, 1998) , cognitive ethology ought to mean something rather broader than anthropomorphic considerations of animal consciousness, namely the role of cognition as information-processing in the kinds of behaviors of interest to ethologists, what is now referred to as cognitive ecology (Dukas & Ratcliff e, 2009; Real, 1993) . Cognition as information processing was what psychologists studying animals were getting interested in at about the same time as Griffi n began promoting cognitive ethology, but quite independently. In the early 1970s, some of these researchers began trying to catch up with the cognitive revolution that was sweeping the study of human psychology. Cognition in this context refers to the mind as a receiver and processor of information, whether conscious or not. Indeed, until more recently, consciousness was not an issue even in research on human cognition, which looked mostly at input-output relations and treated the mind as a black box or a computer. Most of the early leaders of the revolution in animal experimental psychology were trained in good behaviorist methods, which they now began using to test rats or pigeons for processes being studied in humans. Th e book Cognitive Processes in Animal Behavior (Hulse, Fowler, & Honig, 1978) that is often seen as proclaiming the beginning of the fi eld of comparative cognition included a pretty narrow range of topics: conditioning, memory, attention, serial learning, space, time, concepts. Th e range of species was even narrower: rat, pigeon, chimpanzee. Th is research was thoroughly anthropocentric. Encouragement from the growing fi eld of behavioral neuroscience helped to perpetuate this focus, as paradigms for testing memory and the like provided "animal models" for use in studies of neurobiology and ultimately clinical applications (chapter 14 this volume).
Even as this research developed, however, some psychologists complained, as others had in the past (Beach, 1950; Hodos & Campbell, 1969) , that "comparative" cognition research was not genuinely comparative. Th ey called not only for looking at more species but also for studying cognitive processes used to solve information processing problems in nature. A leading example of this synthetic (Kamil & Mauldin, 1988) or ecological (Shettleworth, 1993) approach was the comparative study of spatial memory in birds that do and do not store food. Wild birds were studied both in the fi eld and in standard laboratory paradigms to test the hypothesis that reliance on stored food is associated with precise long-lasting spatial memory. Th is research soon converged with studies of the neurobiology of spatial memory and the hippocampus to become a leading example of so-called neuroecology, or the comparative study of brain mechanisms in relation to diff erences in ecology (Brodin, 2010; Sherry, 2006) . As species that might be expected to show evidence of episodic memory and planning, foodstoring birds have subsequently contributed to research on more general questions about memory and its neural substrate (chapter 12 of this volume; Pravosudov & Smulders, 2010) . Similarly, another specialized behavior shown by birds in the fi eld-tool using by New Caledonian crows and woodpecker fi nches-has led to experimental analyses of more general processes, in this case mechanisms involved in solving physical problems, possibly including insight and physical understanding (Bluff , Weir, Rutz, Wimpenny, & Kacelnik, 2007) .
Another strand in the developing synthetic or, to adopt the title of this Handbook, evolutionary comparative approach, was the growth of behavioral ecology, the subfi eld of ethology devoted to Tinbergen's questions about function and evolution, now incorporating mathematical models of the eff ects of behavior on fi tness (Cuthill, 2005; Danchin, Giraldeau, & Cezilly, 2008) . Perhaps the biggest success in the early days of behavioral ecology was optimal foraging theory (see Krebs & Davies, 1981) . Predictions about fi tness-maximizing decisions concerning where to forage and for how long, what to eat, and so on were often tested in situations resembling psychological studies of learning and choice. Th is resemblance was exploited in some productive collaborations between behavioral ecologists and experimental psychologists (Kacelnik, Brunner, & Gibbon, 1990; Shettleworth, Krebs, Stephens, & Gibbon, 1988) . One common fi nding was that, although observed behavior might conform roughly to predictions of foraging theory, psychological mechanisms such as variable perception and memory for time intervals did a better job of accounting for the details. More recently, some of this research has converged with behavioral economics in looking at simple mechanisms of economic decision making that may cut across species (Kacelnik, 2006; Rosati, Stevens, Hare, & Hauser, 2007; Schuck-Paim, Pompilio, & Kacelnik, 2004) .
Other subfi elds in the broad study of animal behavior have embraced or converged with areas of comparative cognition. Cognitive ecology (Dukas & Ratcliff e, 2009; Real, 1993) has already been alluded to as the study of how cognitive mechanisms evolve and are used in their natural context. Similarly, sensory ecology (Dusenbery, 1992; Endler & Basolo, 1998 ) is the long-standing and well-developed study of animal sensory systems in relation to ecology. Th e development, use, and neurobiology of bird song is a subject large and lively enough for its own conferences and books (e.g., Marler & Slabbekoorn, 2004; Zeigler & Marler, 2004) but with many links to broader issues in comparative cognition, especially language evolution (Margoliash & Nusbaum, 2009 ). Spatial behavior (Gallistel, 1990; Jeff ery, 2003) and social learning (Galef & Heyes, 2004; Heyes & Galef, 1996; Laland & Galef, 2009 ) are also subareas of evolutionary comparative cognition with their own thriving interdisciplinary research communities and conferences. Finally, as evidenced by several chapters in this Handbook, long-term observations and clever fi eld experiments on primates and some other species (e.g., Cheney & Seyfarth, 2007; de Waal & Tyack, 2003) have raised important questions about the cognitive processes involved in communication, tool use, social transmission of behavior, and so on. Laboratory studies of chimpanzees and other primates suggested by such observations sometimes include human children, thus addressing shared mental powers very directly (e.g., Herrmann, Call, Hernández-Lloreda, Hare, & Tomasello, 2007) . Indeed, the recent explosion of data on all aspects of animal cognition underpins several recent reexaminations of Darwin's claim that humans diff er mentally in degree but not in kind from other species (Penn, Holyoak, & Povinelli, 2008; Premack, 2007; Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005) .
As a result of all of these developments, the study of comparative or animal cognition in the broadest sense now embraces three major sets of cognitive processes about equally, addressing them in species from ants to chimpanzees and humans (Shettleworth, 2010) . Basic mechanisms of perception, memory, associative learning, discrimination learning, and categorization cut across all kinds of content. Although comparative psychologists have been studying some of them since Th orndike's time, research in these areas continues to develop. Understanding these basic mechanisms is essential to appreciating how cognition in specifi c physical or social domains may or may not be specialized. Th e latter processes of acquisition, representation, and behavioral control, or cognitive modules, are defi ned largely in terms of their functions, what aspects of the world they are about. Physical cognition includes time, space, number, and instrumental learning, topics that have been studied for quite a long time within experimental psychology, as well as tool using and planning. Social cognition includes social knowledge, that is, what animals know about their social companions and how they come to know it, and the cognitive processing evident in animal communication systems, topics discussed in several chapters in this Handbook. Th us, compared to 25 or 30 years ago, the whole fi eld of comparative cognition encompasses a much broader set of problems, being studied in a very wide sample of species. Th ey are also being studied by a very diverse community of researchers-people trained not only in psychology but behavioral ecology, ethology, anthropology, sometimes human cognitive psychology, and child development, not to mention philosophy. Th is diversity undoubtedly contributes to making the fi eld so rich and interesting, but it also can make for misunderstanding and controversy. Some of the challenges are discussed in the next part of this chapter.
Challenges

From Anthropomorphism to Behavioral Tests
When a chickadee stores a sunfl ower seed, is it planning ahead? When a vervet monkey emits an alarm call, does it want to inform its companions a leopard is near? More generally, when another animal does something that looks human-like, is that behavior evidence for the same cognitive processes underlying analogous behavior in people? How would we tell? Th is last question is especially challenging when dealing with processes documented in humans primarily by verbal report and assumed to be associated with particular states of consciousness (Heyes, 2008; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2010) . Th e challenges range from minimal to virtually intractable. Many are illustrated by research discussed in other chapters of this Handbook, which can be consulted for thorough reviews of topics touched on here.
Animal memory and functional similarity
People often report what they remember by talking about it, but all species exhibit memory nonverbally. In general, if behavior depends on past experience of a particular object or event, the animal is said to have a memory for it. For instance, Darwin (1871) supported his argument for longlasting memories in animals with the observation that when he returned home from his fi ve-year voyage on the Beagle, his dog greeted him as if he had never been away. Some contemporary research similarly exploits the subtle and detailed memories that animals form spontaneously, as in rats' memory for the location and context where they encountered particular objects (Eacott & Norman, 2004) . Even when testing behaviors requiring extensive training, as in comparisons of serial position eff ects across monkeys, pigeons, and people (Wright, 2006) , the goal is to examine functional similarities among patterns of data resulting from comparable manipulations (Heyes, 2008) . Looking for functional similarities means looking for evidence that behaviors and independent variables are related in the same way across species. Obtaining such data may require testing humans in novel ways. Th us, to discover whether monkeys and pigeons show serial position eff ects in memory for lists of visual items, the animals were presented with four trialunique images in sequence. Memory was probed with a single item, and reinforcement was given for correctly indicating whether it had been in the list or not. Because the items had no meaning for the animal subjects, comparable data were obtained from human subjects by testing them with kaleidoscope patterns. All three species and others tested later show dynamic serial position eff ects in serial probe recognition tests, with memory for the most recent items dominating at short retention intervals and memory for the earliest ones at longer intervals. Although the precise retention intervals at which recency and primacy are seen vary with species, the common pattern is evidence for a common memory process (Wright, 2006) . Here, nothing need be said about consciousness.
Metacognition and awareness
Th e comparative study of metacognition, or awareness of one's own cognitive processes (see chapters 12 and 15 of this volume) contrasts with the comparative study of serial position eff ects in that it is addressed to a process that is usually conscious in humans. Metacognition, strictly speaking, implies second-order representation, cognition about cognition, rendering controversial any claim to demonstrate it in a nonhuman species (e.g., Carruthers, 2008; Penn et al., 2008) . As with serial-order eff ects, studies of metacognition include numerous reports of identical patterns of data from human and nonhuman (usually rhesus monkey) subjects in identical tests (e.g., Kornell, 2009; Shields, Smith, Guttmanova, & Washburn, 2005; Smith, Shields, Allendoerfer, & Washburn, 1998; Smith, Shields, Schull, & Washburn, 1997) . Many such tests involve near-threshold perceptual discriminations in which subjects may either classify stimuli into one of two categories or opt out of trials by choosing a third, "uncertain," response. Monkeys, dolphins (Smith et al., 1995) , pigeons (Sole, Shettleworth, & Bennett, 2003) , and people typically make this third response most often when the stimulus is near the threshold of discriminability. Th is pattern can be explained by signal-detection theory and/or responding based on the relative probabilities of reward for the three options at each point along the stimulus continuum (Hampton, 2009; Jozefowiez, Staddon, & Cerutti, 2009; Smith, Beran, Couchman, & Coutinho, 2008; Sole et al., 2003) . Th us, although people say they feel uncertain when they opt out of trials, the functionally similar behavior of other species need not be mediated by a conscious state of uncertainty. Turning the argument around, on some accounts, human metacognitive responses may not be mediated by consciousness either (Carruthers, 2008; Koriat, Hilit, & Nussison, 2006) .
Th e existence of "simpler" explanations here does not rule out the possibility that some sort of metacognitive awareness plays a role since both are compatible with the observed results (Hampton, 2009) . Arguments like those just sketched have, therefore, challenged investigators to devise other tests to isolate evidence of processes closer to what is implied by metacognition in people, that is, to fi nd a situation in which the anthropomorphic "higher" explanation predicts a diff erent outcome from one based on sensitivity to reward rates and external (or public, Hampton, 2009) cues. Th e current best candidate is the test of metamemory used by Hampton (2001) with rhesus monkeys (see Hampton, 2009 ), although some claim that other approaches qualify (e.g., Smith, Beran, Redford, & Washburn, 2006) . In any case, since we cannot get from other species the sorts of verbal reports that we commonly rely on for evidence of consciousness in humans, cleverly delineating functional similarities may be as far as we can go. Even in the rare cases when other forms of behavioral control are ruled out, we still cannot know how closely other species' mental states resemble our own (see e.g., Hampton, 2005; Heyes, 2008) .
Episodic memory: The challenge of multiple definitions
When other species cannot be tested in the same way as humans, new challenges arise. Research on episodic memory in animals (see chapters 12 and 13 of this volume) provides examples. Episodic memory was originally (e.g., Tulving, 1972) defi ned as memory for one's own experiences, as distinct from memory for facts and ideas (semantic memory). But the defi nition evolved to include autonoetic consciousness, the sense of reexperiencing an episodically recollected event, mentally traveling back in time to it (Tulving, 2005) . Since we are unlikely ever to know if animals travel anywhere mentally, comparative researchers have fallen back on the original defi nition and sought evidence that animals have integrated memories for unique events, sometimes called what-where-when memories (see Crystal, 2010) . Accordingly, when Clayton and Dickinson (1998) reported the fi rst demonstrations of such memory, using Western scrub jays' memory for their food caches, they scrupulously referred to the birds as having "episodic-like" memory. Clayton and colleagues went on to show that the birds' memory for what they had cached where and how long ago had other properties attributed to episodic memory. For instance it is a single integrated representation of the caching episode that can be used in a fl exible way (see chapter 12 of this volume).
However, not all agree that the essential features of episodic memory are well captured by the studies with scrub jays. For instance, the animals were trained, albeit not very extensively, to expect certain kinds of tests, making the paradigm essentially one of conditional discrimination learning (Roberts, 2002) . How long ago a caching episode had occurred was a cue to what items would be edible at test, whereas "when" in human episodic memory is typically a defi nite time in the past such as "last Monday." In a paradigm logically equivalent to that developed by Clayton and Dickinson, rats indeed encode "how long ago" rather than "when" (time of day; Roberts et al., 2008) , but they can also use time of day when required to (Zhou & Crystal, 2009 ). It has also been argued (e.g., by Eichenbaum, Fortin, Ergorul, Wright, & Agster, 2005) that the "when" in episodic memory need not be the time at which something occurred but its entire spatio-temporal context. Accordingly, a rat's memory for the location of an object in a particular spatial context (Eacott & Norman, 2004 ) qualifi es as episodic-like, as does memory for the position of an odor in a sequence of odors . Performance in tasks of the latter type, which exploit rats' outstanding ability to discriminate and learn about odors, shares an impressive number of other properties with verbal memory, including eff ects of hippo campal lesions (Fortin, Wright, & Eichenbaum, 2004) .
Another issue is that with human subjects episodic memory is typically probed unexpectedly, so subjects cannot prepare for the test at the time of memory encoding. Accordingly, some clever tests with pigeons have shown that they can "answer unexpected questions" about what they just did (Zentall, Clement, Bhatt, & Allen, 2001 ). However, because these tests probe only very short term memory, they in turn lack another property generally attributed to episodic memory, namely, that it is a species of long-term memory (cf. Hampton & Schwartz, 2004) . As another approach, it may be possible to study naturalistic examples of the spontaneous use of episodic-like memory that do not involve food caching. One candidate is the male meadow vole's ability to recall where and when he encountered a female about to come into estrus so he can time his next visit appropriately (Ferkin, Combs, delBarcoTrillo, Pierce, and Franklin, 2008) . In any case, a wide variety of tests for episodic memory is used by students of human cognition. Studies of comparatively short-term memory for stimuli encountered in the laboratory may be labeled studies of episodic memory (Kohler, Moscovitch, & Melo, 2001) equally with studies of subjects' rich recollections of personal experiences (Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007) . One potential contribution of research with nonverbal species is to focus attention on behavioral criteria for episodic memory in humans (Crystal, 2010) . Th e best current conclusion from comparative research seems to be that memory in nonhuman species shares numerous features with episodic memory in humans, but no single example or species necessarily shares all of them, and autonoetic consciousness may be unique to humans (Crystal, 2009; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2010) .
Future planning, tool use, and folk psychology
Memory presumably evolved not so creatures could ruminate about their pasts but so they could use past experience to determine future behavior. Reasonable as this idea seems, only recently has it been incorporated into conceptions of human episodic memory. Planning, or mental time travel into the future, is now seen as the fl ip side of mental time travel into the past. Both involve autoneotic consciousness and depend on closely similar parts of the brain (Addis et al., 2007) . Research with other species has followed, with attempts to demonstrate that animals show future planning (chapters 12 and 13 of this volume, and Suddendorf & Corballis, 2010) . Two problems bedevil this research. Th e fi rst is that animals have many kinds of behavior that prepare them for the future but which can be accounted for without assuming any representation of the future as such or even requiring specifi c past experiences (Roberts, 2002) . Examples include migrating, hibernating, storing food, building nests, responding to learned signals about delays to food. Th e second is that relevant research on planning or future time travel in people, including how it develops in young children, is at an early stage, leaving researchers studying animals with little more than folk psychology to guide the formulation of behavioral defi nitions. As a result, the crucial features distinguishing behavior based on some sort of representation of the future as such from other kinds of future oriented behavior are still debated. Suddendorf and Busby (2005) proposed that a behavior that was novel and that was performed in the service of a motivational state other than the one the animal was in at the moment, as in gathering food when not hungry, would be evidence of future planning. But with the accumulation of fi ndings fi tting these criteria, some have seen a need for additional specifi cations. For instance, domain generality (Premack, 2007) rules out adaptations of particular behavior systems, such as food storing. Being performed on a single test (Suddendorf & Corballis, 2010) rules out gradual learning through delayed reward. Specifi city to a particular future time (Roberts & Feeney, 2009 ) implies a conception of the future as such.
Such criteria seem to rest more on appeal to folk psychological, anthropomorphic, conceptions of planning than on parallel data from humans. Similarly, in a purported demonstration of planning by apes (Mulcahy & Call, 2006) , the animals had multiple opportunities to collect a tool that could not be used right away, but in most cases successful trials were scattered more or less randomly across all trials. Folk psychology would seem to suggest that once an animal had discovered the rules of the game it would plan on every trial, so is this or is this not evidence of future time travel (Shettleworth, 2010; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2008) ? In any case, folk psychology is not necessarily a good predictor of how people behave when tested like other animals. For instance, when people are given tests similar to those failed by apes, they may behave irrationally too. Human subjects avoid a tool that brings a reward close to a hole or trap, even when it will not fall in (Silva, Page, & Silva, 2005) , and like apes they may choose to pull a string contacting but not actually connected to a reward (Silva, Silva, Cover, Leslie, & Rubalcaba, 2008) .
Varieties of Proximal Cause
Translating anthropomorphism into unambiguous behavioral tests challenges researchers to isolate the specifi c cognitive mechanism of interest from other possible causal factors for observed behavior. Th is can be entirely straightforward and uncontroversial, as in research on nonverbal numerosity discrimination, that is, discrimination among arrays of visual stimuli, strings of sounds, and so on, according to the numbers of items they contain. Here it is necessary to rule out reliance on some correlated feature such as the amount of space or time the items occupy (for review see Shettleworth, 2010) . Only if discrimination remains accurate with novel items varying in shape, size, color, contour length, and so on, are subjects said to be displaying evidence of sensitivity to numerosity. Th is need not mean that control by nonnumerical features is entirely absent (see Cantlon & Brannon, 2005) , but the strategy of establishing one sort of control by ruling out alternatives works well here. Sometimes, however, in the enthusiasm for using behavior as the readout of cognition, other kinds of proximal causes for a target behavior can be overlooked. What Skinner and Tinbergen taught us about the importance of past history and present cues is not obsolete just because cognition is being tested. In the spirit of Tinbergen's four kinds of causes of behavior, even when looking only at proximal causes, there may be more than one kind of answer.
A classic example comes from an early experimental study of theory of mind in chimpanzees. Th e animals could choose to beg for hidden food from one of two people when one had seen it hidden and one had not. To test whether their choice of the former individual was based on sensitivity to the person's knowledge state (i.e., theory of mind), the animals were given a series of rewarded tests in which one observer had a paper bag over his head, a novel cue to ignorance (Povinelli, Nelson, & Boysen, 1990) . Overall, the animals tended to beg from the observer who could see, a result consistent with theory of mind. However, rewarded tests are learning trials, and closer analysis showed that the animals chose randomly on the fi rst two tests but learned to use the novel cue during the next few trials (Povinelli, 1994) . Similarly, in recent studies of dogs' sensitivity to human social cues, the possibility of learning during a short series of test trials may be dismissed too readily (Udell, Dorey, & Wynne, 2010) . Th is is especially so because a plausible alternative to a preexisting or very early-developing theory of mind in dogs is that during domestication they have evolved an exceptional sensitivity to and ability to learn about human behavior (Reid, 2009) .
Another example comes from a simple test for the spontaneous use of metamemory devised by Call and Carpenter (2001) for apes and children and then used by Hampton and colleagues (Hampton, Zivin, & Murray, 2004) with rhesus monkeys. In the latter version, the monkey watches as an experimenter places a treat in one of four horizontal tubes and is then allowed to tip up one tube so the reward slides out. By bending over, the monkey can peer into the tubes before choosing, a slightly eff ortful behavior that is unnecessary when the opportunity to choose a tube comes immediately after witnessing baiting. However, when baiting is done behind an opaque screen, the task becomes a test of metamemory: if they are aware they have no memory of a recent baiting, monkeys should more often look before choosing. Th e possibility that looking on trials with the screen was acquired because it was rewarded more frequently than not looking under this condition was ruled out by familiarizing the monkeys with the elements of the task, pulling and looking, before introducing the opaque screen. When the opaque screen was then introduced, most monkeys looked more often right away.
But the proximal cause of looking here is not necessarily awareness of memory strength, that is, of metamemory. An old-fashioned ethological causal analysis readily shows that the monkeys' behavior can be accounted for in terms of confl ict between two competing behavioral tendencies (see Hampton, 2009) . Of the two responses learned before the test, pulling and looking, correct pulling leads to reward with a shorter delay. Because monkeys were well trained on this response initially, it is likely to be elicited when baiting is seen. With baiting unseen or forgotten, the tendency to pull should be weaker, if only because the normal cues that elicit it are absent. Additionally, regardless of whether baiting was seen or not, looking is rewarded only after the delay that is necessary to locate the baited tube. However, when baiting is unseen and the tendency to pull is, therefore, weak, looking will emerge as the stronger response. In this way appropriate information seeking-metacognitive behavior in a sense-need not depend on explicit awareness of memory strength. Th e same may be true of people in similar situations (Carruthers, 2008; Hampton, 2009; Kornell, 2009) . Th e requirement for viewing tests of "higher" cognitive capacities from the animal's point of view, in terms of the cues present, their past histories, and the relative strengths of responses they elicit by virtue of training and/or evolution transcends these few examples. In such cases it may not be necessary to assume any representations of memory strength or similar higher-order causal factors are present. Th is is similar to the point made repeatedly by Povinelli and his colleagues about tests of theory of mind or physical understanding (e.g., Penn & Povinelli, 2007) : animals may behave eff ectively on the basis of representations of observable cues, without representing unseen mental or physical causes. Examples from animal problem solving are discussed later in this chapter.
Function and Mechanism and Diff erent Ways of Using Language
Many interdisciplinary fi elds bring together people who use the same words in diff erent ways. In comparative cognition, this often means using terms that have both functional and mechanistic defi nitions, leading to disagreement and debate when people understand diff erent things by them. In cognitive science, this is the problem of confusing functional and representational explanations (Penn & Povinelli, 2009 ). In various guises, the same problem is widespread in the study of animal behavior. In Tinbergen's writings and subsequent discussions (Bolhuis & Verhulst, 2009) , it is the confusion of function with cause. As discussed by John Kennedy (1992) in his insightful little book Th e New Anthropomorphism, such confusion is particularly insidious in behavioral ecology, where the tendency to label behaviors anthropomorphicallyfor example "rape," "deception," "strategy"-creates the illusion that they can be explained by the same conscious processes that accompany analogous behavior in people. Even when such behaviors have a formal defi nition within behavioral ecology, labeling them with terms current in ordinary language and/or other fi elds can lead to unnecessary disagreements. One example comes from recent claims to demonstrate animal teaching (Hoppitt et al., 2008; Shettleworth, 2010) .
Teaching has had an accepted functional defi nition in evolutionary studies of behavior for nearly 20 years (Caro & Hauser, 1992) . To qualify as teaching, an animal must modify its behavior in the presence of naïve individuals in a way that makes possible or speeds up their learning, and it must do so at some immediate cost to itself. Th is last criterion suggests that, as seems to be the case, teaching may be rare but that, when it is seen, those taught will be related to the teacher, thus eventually conveying a fi tness benefi t to the teacher. Notice that this definition implies nothing about whether the teacher understands the pupils' need to learn, only that some cues from potential pupils elicit appropriate and costly behavior. Th is is exactly what was shown in an elegant demonstration that meerkats teach their young how to handle scorpions (Th ornton & McAuliff e, 2006) . When pups are very young (and hence inexperienced), as indicated by their begging calls, adults present them with dead or disabled scorpions. As the pups mature (again indicated by their begging calls) adults bring scorpions that need more and more processing. Adults also engage in other time-consuming behaviors that ensure the young learn to catch and disable scorpions for themselves. Th at the young do in fact learn from the experience so provided was shown by the benefi cial eff ects of experimentally providing extra scorpions. Th e adult meerkats' behavior thus meets all the accepted functional criteria for teaching, but for those to whom "teaching" means human pedagogy, labeling it as such is deeply controversial (Csibra, 2007; Premack, 2007) . In the context of behavioral ecology, the adult meerkats' behavior could be described as governed by "rules of thumb" such as "when hearing calls of very young pups, bring dead scorpions." In ethological terms, the calls are sign stimuli, but either way the adults teach eff ectively in the absence of any representation of the pups' understanding or need to know.
Sampling in optimal foraging theory also exemplifi es the sort of term discussed by Kennedy (1992) in that it has a functional meaning in a certain context but implies an anthropomorphic mechanism. Classic models of optimal foraging indicate that, to choose the best food item or foraging patch, individuals should sample, gathering information that might be useful when conditions change. even if that sometimes means abandoning the currently best option. Th e notion that animals might sample in this way seems to fl y in the face of the well-established fi nding from psychology laboratories that animals strongly prefer immediate rewards. In terms of reinforcement theory, if patch A is currently paying off at the highest rate available, animals should never choose patch B except by mistake. Shettleworth, Krebs, Stephens, and Gibbon (1988) pitted these accounts against each other in an operant study with pigeons that simulated two foraging patches, one of which was stable and one of which changed abruptly in payoff rate from time to time, sometimes becoming much better than the stable patch. Th e optimal strategy is to sample this fl uctuating patch with a specifi able frequency depending on such things as the reward rate in the stable patch (Stephens, 1987) . Th e birds did, in fact, sample at roughly the predicted frequency in several experimental conditions, but their behavior was best accounted for by a general model of instrumental choice (Gibbon, Church, Fairhurst, & Kacelnik, 1988) , in which animals always choose the option perceived to predict the shortest delay to reward based on a fuzzy memory of the delays associated with each option present. Th us animals can "sample" approximately optimally but without doing so in the anthropomorphic sense of deliberately rejecting the shortest current delay to reward in order to collect information that is useful in the long term.
Th is same timing model of choice between reinforcement schedules accounts for behavior in a variety of other laboratory tests of optimal foraging (e.g., Kacelnik & Bateson, 1996; Kacelnik et al., 1990) . More recently the analysis of animal foraging decisions has evolved to connect with studies of economic decision making. In studies of analogues to the sunk costs eff ect and infl uences of irrelevant alternatives on choice, other species make the same sorts of "irrational" decisions as do humans, and again the results can be explained by general mechanisms of reinforcement and choice (Bateson, Healy, & Hurly, 2003; Kacelnik & Marsh, 2002) . As discussed in depth by Kacelnik (2006) , such work integrates the contrasting but interrelated approaches to rationality in evolutionary biology, economics, and psychology.
Clever Animals and Killjoy Explanations
Explanations of apparently complex processes as the product of simpler ones, as in animal teaching and sampling behavior, sometimes seem to have a diff erent status in comparative cognition than elsewhere in biology. As Darwin so eloquently argued in Th e Origin of Species, the whole wondrous complexity of organic evolution can be explained as the outcome of simple processes, here variation, selection, and inheritance. Similarly, collective behavior of animal groups as in the exquisite regulation of a honeybee colony or the coordinated movements of schooling fi sh, is increasingly well understood as the result of local responses by myriads of individuals (Couzin, 2009) . It is hard not to be in awe of how a perfectly air-conditioned termite mound can be constructed without any instructions from a termite architect. However, explaining behaviors that look as if they require human-like thought in terms of simple processes such as associative learning and species-typical predispositions seems tantamount to denial of mental continuity between humans and other animals. Labeling such explanations as "killjoy" originated in Dennett's (1983) analysis of levels of intentionality in cognitive ethology. In his principal example, a monkey's alarm call might refl ect wanting its fellows to move away, wanting them to know a predator is approaching, or even higher levels of intentionality. Th e killjoy alternative is that the sight of a predator refl exively elicits calling. One of Dennett's central points was that because, in principle, they can be put to the test with experiments and opportunistic observations, the mentalistic claims of the cognitive ethologists should not be dismissed out of hand. Characterizing fi rst-and higher-order intentionality as "exciting" explanations, in contrast with "killjoy bottom-of-the-barrel" zero-order or refl exive explanations may have been no more than a device for emphasizing the important potential contribution of cognitive ethology. However, the implication that complex or higher-order explanations of apparently cognitively demanding behavior should be valued more than simpler ones encourages a tendency implicit in some contemporary research reports to dismiss accounts based on simple learning mechanisms before thoroughly testing them.
Research on the possibility of insight in animals provides some illustrations. Controversy over whether animals solve problems insightfully dates from the earliest days of comparative psychology (Boakes, 1984) . Th orndike 's (1911/1970) conclusion from his puzzle box experiments-that only trial and error learning was involved-was in turn put to the test by Wolfgang Kohler (1925 Kohler ( /1959 in his studies of chimpanzees using sticks or climbing on boxes to reach inaccessible food. Some animals did appear to solve problems insightfully, but there was much evidence for trial and error learning too (Povinelli, 2000) . Subsequent research suggested that experience with sticks, boxes, and the like contributed to their later successful use (Birch, 1945; Schiller, 1957) . Current interest in the possibility of animal insight (e.g., Bird & Emery, 2009a; Heinrich, 1995) is thus one more swing of the pendulum.
Th e defi nition of insightful behavior most often referred to in this context is that formulated by the British ethologist W. H. Th orpe (1956) : "the sudden production of a new adaptive response not arrived at by trial behavior" (i.e., trial and error; Th orpe, 1956, p. 100; italics in original) . Similarly, in human problem solving (Sternberg & Davidson, 1995; Weisberg, 2006) insightful solutions have three general properties:
1. Th ey appear suddenly, accompanied by a distinctive subjective experience of surprise and delight-the "aha moment" (Kounios & Beeman, 2009) .
2. Th ey usually appear after an impasse, that is, after a period of unsuccessful attempts-rather than by gradually homing in on the solution through an analytical approach (Weisberg, 2006) . 3. Th ey involve restructuring the problem, that is, approaching it in a new way.
Other than "aha moments," these criteria correspond well with what is implied by Th orpe's definition. Th e question with both animal and human subjects is whether behavior meeting these criteria involves a distinctive cognitive process, namely insight. As originally conceived by Kohler and other Gestalt psychologists, insight consists of suddenly "seeing" the solution, a perceptual process like seeing the alternative form of a reversing fi gure (Mayer, 1995) . In contemporary discussions of human problem solving (e.g., Kounios & Beeman, 2009; Weisberg, 2006) insight contrasts with the analytical approach, examining possible solutions in the mind's eye or in actuality until an eff ective one is found. People readily report whether they have used insight or analysis to solve even simple verbal problems (Bowden, Jung-Beeman, Fleck, & Kounios, 2005) . Some contemporary students of animal problem solving (e.g., Bird & Emery, 2009b) have incorporated mental analysis into their conception of insight, but because we cannot ask animals whether they mentally tried possible solutions or simply "saw" how to succeed, this is not only historically and comparatively inaccurate but behaviorally meaningless. In any case, not all agree that subjective experience is the best guide to mechanism even in human problem solving (cf. Weisberg, 2006) .
With both animal and human subjects, discovering whether behaviorfi tting criteria 1-3 from the preceding list refl ects a special cognitive mechanism typically consists of ruling out alternative mechanisms. For nonhuman species the generally accepted alternative is associative learning, but the subtle ways in which past learning together with species-typical behaviors and present cues might generate complex and apparently novel behavior are not always fully appreciated or rigorously tested. A well-known illustration of how simple forms of learning and other basic behavioral principles can produce apparently insightful behavior is the demonstration (Epstein, Kirshnit, Lanza, & Rubin, 1984) that pigeons with appropriate past experience solve a novel "banana and box" problem, just as Kohler's (1925 Kohler's ( /1959 apes did, by moving a box and climbing on it to reach a hanging (toy) banana. All pigeons in the study had previously been rewarded with food for climbing onto the box and pecking the banana, but the only birds that "insightfully" solved the problem had also been extinguished for jumping and fl ying toward the banana when the box was absent. In addition, in interleaved sessions without the banana, they had been rewarded with food for pushing the box toward a spot at varying locations on the wall. In the test, they looked back and forth between banana and box at fi rst, appearing confused, but then approached the box and pushed it toward the banana.
Directed pushing and climbing to peck contributed to success through a few simple mechanisms (Epstein, 1985) . First, a basic principle of ethology is that various cues in a situation may control incompatible behaviors in ways that may change dynamically with behavior. Here, when the pigeons fi rst confronted the banana and the displaced box, looking back and forth was the expression of two learned behaviors that were both elicited but could not be completed. Because the birds had been explicitly extinguished for fl ying and jumping at the banana, approach to the box and then pushing it soon predominated. Th e banana became the target of pushing in the absence of the spot because both banana and spot had been associated with food, that is, through functional (also called mediated) generalization (Urcuioli, 2006) . Finally, by pushing the box toward the banana, the "insightful" pigeons produced the situation (box under banana) in which climbing had been reinforced. Th e latter process is what Epstein calls automatic chaining. Epstein (e.g., 1985) claims that such combining of old behaviors in new ways underlies human as well as animal creativity. Th is is a strong claim to be put against claims that insightful problem solutions involve a special process of insight or physical understanding. Taking Epstein's claim seriously means deconstructing situations in which animals solve problems in apparently novel ways into elements and testing whether experience with these elements can explain the performances of interest.
Several recent examples involve tool using by birds of the crow family (corvids), both New Caledonian Crows, which naturally make and use tools, and non-tool-using species, such as rooks and ravens, which can solve similar tasks when tested appropriately. In one case (Bird & Emery, 2009a) rooks were shaped to nudge a stone so it fell down a tube and released food from an apparatus at the bottom. Remarkably, when stones were no longer provided at the mouth of the tube, rooks brought stones from nearby. What experience might contribute to the apparently spontaneous fetching and dropping of stones remains to be determined. A further study using New Caledonian crows (von Bayern, Heathcote, Rutz, & Kacelnik, 2009) showed that once they are experienced pushing stones down the tube, these birds also bring stones to the apparatus, but they do not require previous experience seeing stones release the food. Birds that had pecked or used a stick to operate a similar apparatus fi tted with a short tube became more likely to bring and drop stones through the long tube. Exactly what the birds need to learn here remains to be determined. For instance, they may learn that contact with the mechanism at the bottom of the tube releases food and for still-unknown reasons generalize this to producing contact with stones.
More extensive analyses of the experiences necessary for New Caledonian crows to use tools in novel ways have been done with metatool use, that is, using one tool to obtain another with which food can be obtained. Metatool use has been claimed to be especially human-like (see Taylor, Hunt, Holzhaider, & Gray, 2007) , and various species of primates can show it (see Wimpenny, Weir, Clayton, Rutz, & Kacelnik, 2009) . Using a metatool eff ectively on the fi rst opportunity, before the required chain of behavior could be primarily reinforced, has been suggested to reveal insight or reasoning (Taylor, Elliff e, Hunt, & Gray, 2010; Taylor et al., 2007) . In the fi rst demonstration of such behavior (Taylor et al., 2007) , New Caledonian crows provided with a stick too short to reach a reward used that stick to obtain a long stick, which they then used eff ectively. Notwithstanding the claim in the article's title, this behavior was "spontaneous"; in fact, the birds were trained beforehand on several elements of the problem: obtaining meat with the long stick, extracting a long stick from a container, and failing to obtain meat with the short stick. But even though use of the short stick to obtain meat directly was extinguished during this pretraining, both the crows' natural predisposition to handle sticks and stimulus (or mediated) generalization from the long stick would have been expected to support the observed use of the short stick. No special understanding of metatools need be invoked. In an extension of this study (Taylor et al., 2010) , the same group of researchers compared two groups of birds with diff erent experiences of the elements in a sequence of two metatools. Although they concluded that the successful birds in this study used causal reasoning rather than solely the mechanisms identifi ed by Epstein, further research is needed to test this conclusion.
Epstein's approach implies that in cognitive tests we need to make a careful ethological analysis of the cues available and their past histories and/or the animal's predispositions toward them. For example, when only one potential tool is off ered, it should not be surprising if the animal tries to use that tool in some way, especially if the tool is a stick and the animal has a natural or learned propensity to manipulate sticks. Th us, tests presenting only one option, in eff ect asking whether the animal uses the tool or not, may be less informative than tests with several diff erent tools, asking whether the animal chooses the best tool for the job. In such a test with New Caledonian crows (Wimpenny et al., 2009) , inexperienced birds did not always choose the correct length stick. Related research is ongoing with primates as well as birds. Even with chimpanzees, how a task requiring tool use is presented may infl uence whether the animals appear to understand the solution or not. For instance, chimpanzees may be able to avoid losing food into a trap when allowed to slide it along with a fi nger but fail when required to use a stick tool (Seed, Call, Emery, & Clayton, 2009 ; also see Girndt, Meier, & Call, 2008) . Th e examples sketched here indicate that progress in understanding how animals solve novel problems is more likely from examining the contributions of simple learning mechanisms and species-typical behavioral predispositions than from attempting to prove the existence of reasoning or insight. Discovering how animals successfully interact with their social and physical worlds through such simple mechanisms should be as much as cause for joy as any validation of anthropomorphism.
Cognition from the Bottom Up
Th e approach to tool use represented by the study of the "insightful" pigeons illustrates a central theme of this chapter: complex behavior often arises from simple elements. Th is bottom-up approach is becoming increasingly common in the comparative study of cognition. Some of the oldest questions about the cognitive abilities of nonhuman species, such as "Do animals count" "Do they talk?" "Or have cognitive maps?" are being replaced by questions such as, "What are the elements of this cognitive ability?" "How are they shared across species and why?" Th is approach to episodic memory, planning, and metacognition has been mentioned. Other examples include the study of numerical cognition (Brannon, 2006; Nieder, 2005) , language (Hauser, Chomsky, & Fitch, 2002; Margoliash & Nusbaum, 2009 ), same-diff erent conceptualization (Wasserman & Young, 2010) , spatial behavior (see chapter 8 of Shettleworth, 2010, ) , other-regarding behavior (de Waal, 2008; Warneken & Tomasello, 2009 , chapter 20 of this volume), and theory of mind (Call & Tomasello, 2008) . Sometimes this "bottom-up" approach means looking for shared neural mechanisms (de Waal & Ferrari, 2010) , but more often elemental cognitive processes are defi ned at the level of behavior (Shettleworth, 2010) . Either way, this approach compares human cognition to that of other species in terms of an interplay of shared and unique processes. In numerical cognition, for example, even human babies share with other species an ability to discriminate approximately among diff erent numerosities, with accuracy dependent on their ratios as described by Weber's Law. However, precise discrimination among quantities greater than about four appears to depend on number language and thus be confi ned to numerate humans. A more sweeping claim is that, despite all the cognitive abilities shared by humans and other animals, only humans have higher order or relational concepts (Penn et al., 2008) . Only in the light of so much new research on cognitive abilities in nonhumans is it possible meaningfully to address such claims.
Further contributions to a bottom-up analysis of cognition come from developments in the study of human psychology that are revealing an unexpected role in human behavior for simple, largely unconscious, nonverbal processes, such as those found in other animals. Such work contrasts with the traditional Darwinian search for the human-like in animals in being a search for the animal-like in humans, but it is equally Darwinian. Although, as discussed at the beginning of this chapter, emphasis on demonstrating human-like mechanisms in animal behavior can be traced to Th e Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex (Darwin, 1871) Darwin (1872 Darwin ( /1965 emphasized the opposite. For instance, in the Introduction he writes, "With mankind some expressions, such as the bristling of the hair under the infl uence of extreme terror, or the uncovering of the teeth under that of furious rage, can hardly be understood, except on the belief that man once existed in a much lower and animallike form" (p. 19, (Darwin 1872 (Darwin /1965 ). Darwin's ideas about the origins and functions of emotional expression are still being tested (e.g., Susskind et al., 2008) . Many examples of unconscious and unexpected infl uences on human behavior come from classic evolutionary psychology (see chapter 4 of this volume).
, in Th e Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals
In cognitive psychology, implicit memory and automatic processing of some fundamental information (Hasher & Zacks, 1984) are well studied in humans, but other unconscious processes lead to more "animal-like," less-rational outcomes such as preference for immediacy and other biases in economic decision making. Presented appropriately, abstract transitive inference problems are solved by human subjects in the "stupid" way typical of pigeons (Frank, Rudy, Levy, & O'Reily, 2005) . Evidence that we respond unconsciously to simple social cues is widespread even though it violates our intuitions about how we behave (Goddard, 2009 ). As one example, when images of eyes were "watching" the box for contributions to a coff ee pool, average payments more than doubled over weeks when fl ower images were present instead (Bateson, Nettle, & Roberts, 2006) . Andin some cases, processes studied fi rst in other species have later been demonstrated in people, using nonverbal tests. For instance, the ability of disoriented rats to reorient using the geometry of a surrounding space is shared not only with birds, fi sh, and monkeys, but also with young children and, under appropriate conditions, adults (Cheng & Newcombe, 2005) , leading to a proposal that in human spatial cognition insights from animals should replace the anthropomorphic concept of the cognitive map (Wang & Spelke, 2002) . Such developments seem to promise convergence of bottom-up analyses of human behavior with similar analyses of other species into a richer comparative psychology more deeply rooted in an understanding of how fundamental evolutionary processes produce complexity from simple species-general elements.
Future Directions
As this Handbook illustrates, these are exciting times for comparative cognitive psychology, but the fundamental tension represented in this chapter by Darwin and Tinbergen is still with us. Th e participation in the fi eld of people with diverse backgrounds and interests maintains this tension. It can be negotiated productively to the extent that researchers with diff erent approaches continue to be engaged with one another. Th ere is a fi ne line between dismissing "higher" processes as excessively anthropomorphic and dismissing "lower" ones as not conceivably capable of doing the job. A priori, Morgan's canon or evolutionary theory does not necessarily dictate either. Solid evidence supporting one or another explanation for a given behavior depends to some extent on what alternative explanations are entertained, and that often depends on deep and imaginative understanding of the species under study. As emphasized in this chapter, it also depends on an appreciation of the contributions made by ethology and basic learning theory as well as the many contemporary fi elds that converge in the comparative study of cognition.
